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Public Values and Private Virtue
by
SUZANNA SHERRY*
Professor Novak's article' is a much-needed breath of fresh air,
because of both its historical approach and its rejection of a paradigm
of pure individualism. Professor Novak eloquently reminds us that
constitutional theorists of all political stripes are today both more
presentist and more individualist than their predecessors. His paper is
a gentle suggestion that we might do well to moderate these modern
tendencies.
Professor Novak's thorough historical examination persuasively
debunks the myth of the early nineteenth century as the constitutional
parent of the twentieth. Indeed, his paper shows us that comparing
the length of a line and the weight of a rock is perhaps a more apt
description of comparisons between the constitutional jurisprudence
of the two centuries than it is of attempts to balance private rights and
public values.
Successful as it is, however, Professor Novak's article is only the
first step. Moreover, like many attempts to correct prevalent miscon-
ceptions, its strength is also its weakness: In his desire to reintroduce
the missing concepts of historical knowledge and common or commu-
nity interests, Professor Novak unintentionally goes too far and un-
dervalues both individualism and presentism.
I share Professor Novak's appreciation for historical knowledge.
I find it almost inconceivable that any scholar interested in the future
of constitutional law should be uninterested in its past: How are we to
decide where we should be going unless we know where we have
been?
Indeed, I would go further and suggest that we ought to indulge
in at least a mild presumption that past constitutional traditions are
worth preserving. In general, a prudent regard for tradition-a reluc-
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tance to embrace change for its own sake-is a positive value. As
James Boyd White suggests, we "should meditate long before exercis-
ing [critical judgment] against the texts that have behind them the au-
thority of our tradition."'2 A failure to accord proper respect to the
past is the height of self-indulgent presumptuousness because it as-
sumes that we stand at the pinnacle of human progress.
Nevertheless, too great a fascination with the past carries an op-
posite danger. If the late twentieth century is not the pinnacle of pro-
gress, neither were the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We must
sift through our constitutional inheritance critically, lest we succumb
to the complacency of believing that "where we have been is where we
want to be."' 3 Constitutional interpretation can, and must, simultane-
ously acknowledge our debt to the past and deny that the past should
control the present. In other words, we must be both willing and re-
luctant to alter the status quo, avoiding both an unthinking adherence
to tradition and an overeagerness for change. Professor Novak's pa-
per reminds us that our traditions have value, and I would add only
that we must be careful of exaggerating that value.
In addition to reminding us of the value of history, Professor No-
vak uses that history to show us that our heritage is not one of unre-
lenting individualism. He persuasively demonstrates that our
fascination with individual rights as distinct from community values is
a modern phenomenon. Although he does not put it quite the same
way, his article has much in common with the neo-republican move-
ment in constitutional scholarship. Professor Novak's emphasis on
law and regulation as a means to "the promotion of public happiness
in the good society," containing "aspirational, cultural, historical [and]
moral imperatives,"'4 echoes the neo-republican call for a revival of
civic virtue.5 In both accounts, individuals are part of, and accounta-
ble to, their communities, and the highest form of human flourishing is
2. James Boyd White, Is Cultural Criticism Possible?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1382
(1986); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990);
Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567
(1985).
3. Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 204 (1993).
4. Novak, supra note 1, at 1082, 1083.
5. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1986); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitu-
tional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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participation in the life of the community. Individual rights are not so
much devalued as incomprehensible: The rights of the individual sim-
ply cannot be separated from the rights of the citizen, and hence of
the polity.
To some extent, I subscribe to this portrait of the views of earlier
generations. The expectation of civic virtue, and pervasive community
definition and description of aspirations and values, were common-
place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; the mod-
em antinomy of individual and community was much less
pronounced.
But Professor Novak neglects, or perhaps even rejects, an equally
important strand of our constitutional heritage-natural rights. At
least until the Civil War (and perhaps beyond), many American politi-
cians and jurists assumed the existence of a broad pantheon of unwrit-
ten and inalienable individual rights.6 One political theory animating
both the Declaration of Independence and the Revolution was a the-
ory of natural, inalienable political rights.7 After independence, state
and federal judges enforced those unwritten rights in state after state
and case after case. In measuring the validity of statutes, judges re-
ferred not only to the written constitutions but also to such things as
"natural justice,"8 "common right and reason," 9 "the dictates of the
moral sense,"'10 "the maxims of eternal justice,"" "the rights of the
6. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 219-21, 258-71 (1990); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the
States, 61 U. CN. L. REv. 171 (1992) [hereinafter Sherry, Natural Law]; Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987) [hereinafter Sherry,
Founders' Unwritten Constitution]; John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment,
42 EMORY LJ. 967 (1993).
7. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 180-84 (1967); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 9-11; FORREST McDoN-
ALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 57-59
(1985); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSITrUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 87-95 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43,52 (1815); Bradshaw v. Rodgers,
20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) ("natural right and justice"), rev'd on other
grounds, 20 Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823); Elliott's Ex'rs v. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) 268, 283, 285
(1802); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) ("vital
principles" and "general principles of law and reason"); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 403
(1814) (determining that a legislative resolution superseding statutes of limitation for a
particular claim was contrary to "natural justice").
9. See, e.g., Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (1789); see also Robinson v.
Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 391, 422 (1818) ("principles of reason, justice and moral
rectitude").
10. Ware v. Hyton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199,255 (1796); see also Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6
Call) 113, 150 (1804) ("the dictation of moral justice").
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subject,"'12 and "natural rights."'1 3 In many cases, judges used unwrit-
ten rights to strike down statutes that violated no provision of the
written constitution.
14
Thus eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Americans had perhaps
an even more robust perception of rights than we do today, including
both written and unwritten rights. Yet, as Professor Novak suggests,
these earlier generations had no trouble reconciling that reverence for
individual rights with pervasive regulation in the interests of the com-
munity (or, in more republican terms, with civic virtue). Why is it that
we, unlike our predecessors, see rights and virtue as competing and
perhaps incommensurable?
Part of the answer is simply a question of emphasis. Nineteenth-
century legal positivism left us with more confidence in written rights
than in unwritten aspirations. We have gradually intensified our reli-
ance on rights until, in Mary Ann Glendon's words, rights have be-
come "less about human dignity and freedom than about insistent,
unending desires."' 5 If individual rights loom so large in our political
and constitutional landscape, it is difficult to find room to accommo-
date public values.
But I think there is also a more disturbing explanation for our
inability to replicate the easy accommodation of our forefathers. They
knew-and we are in danger of forgetting-that rights do not exist in
isolation, but rather as concomitants of responsibility. Professor No-
vak's quotation from Justice Lemuel Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Al-
ger,'6 illustrates how intertwined were the rights and responsibilities
of citizenship: "[E]very holder of property.., holds it under the im-
plied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be
... injurious to the rights of the community.' 7 This notion of individ-
11. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50; see also Dunn v. City Council, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 189, 199
(1824) ("immutable principles of justice").
12. See, e.g., Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 270 (1819).
13. See, e.g., In re Albany St., 11 Wend. 149, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Page v. Pendle-
ton (Va. Ch. Ct. 1793), reprinted in GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 211, 216 n.(e) (B.B. Minor ed., 1852). For complete
documentation and analysis of the judicial, non-textual references, see Sherry, Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, supra note 6, at 1134-46, 1167-76; Sherry, Natural Law, supra note
6.
14. See generally Sherry, Founders' Unwritten Constitution, supra note 6; Sherry, Nat-
ural Law, supra note 6; Yoo, supra note 6.
15. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE 171 (1991).
16. 62 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
17. Novak, supra note 1, at 1070 (quoting Alger, 62 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 84-85).
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ual responsibility toward the community was part and parcel of the
founders' faith in natural rights. Even John Locke, often assumed to
be the progenitor of modem American rights-oriented liberalism, sug-
gested that the natural right to property was limited by the needs of
the community. According to Locke, a man can only acquire property
if "there is enough, and as good left in common for others.' 8
The link between rights and responsibilities persisted through Re-
construction. During arguments over the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, the question of women's suffrage was raised and
soundly defeated. At least one of the arguments against it was exem-
plified by the comments of Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen of New
Jersey: "[T]he women of America are not called upon to serve the
government as the men of America are. They do not bear the bayo-
net, and have not that reason why they should be entitled to the ballot
.*."..,19 For the Reconstruction generation, as for the eighteenth-cen-
tury founders, rights and responsibilities were intertwined (the right to
vote, for example, was linked with the duty to defend).
So the founding generation, and succeeding generations for at
least a hundred years, had little trouble reconciling private rights and
public values, largely because private rights necessarily implied pri-
vate responsibilities, and thus were naturally bounded by community
needs.
We have lost that element of individual responsibility. Individu-
als are no longer seen as responsible for their own shortcomings. We
are all victims of circumstance, and therefore not accountable for our
irresponsible, illegal, or immoral behavior. As victims, we are owed
reparations-which come in various forms, including some claimed
rights-but owe nothing in return.
I have time to give only a few examples of the triumph of isolated
and absolute rights over responsible citizenship. First, many young
Americans, when asked what the American flag stands for, respond
with some version of "the right to do what we want."20 Second, legal
scholarship, which should be more balanced, similarly privileges rights
over responsibility: A recent article in the Yale Law Journal laments
welfare reforms designed to discourage unwed teenage parenthood as
wrongly penalizing those who do not "conform to majoritarian mid-
18. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATnSES OF GovERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967) (6th ed. 1764).
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1866).
20. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 8 (quoting a television talk show host).
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die-class values," 21 and an article in the Wisconsin Law Review argues
that a woman whose job is to encourage teenagers to avoid pregnancy
in favor of more constructive life choices has the right to keep her job
even if she chooses to have an illegitimate child.22 Lastly (although
there are many more examples), the ACLU has opposed allowing
public housing authorities to exclude or evict tenants who commit
crimes.
23
What these examples suggest-and they are quite typical-is that
too many of us now claim an inalienable right to act irresponsibly.
Such claims present a twofold danger: They undermine traditional
notions of the responsibilities of citizenship, and they invite a backlash
against even the responsible exercise of individual rights. It would be
tragic if the loss of our virtue also cost us our liberties.
21. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Re-
form Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 720-21 (1992).
22. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 550-76.
23. See, e.g., Thomas Bell, Bill to Hasten Drug Evictions Clears One Hurdle, WASH.
POST, Mar. 22, 1990, at J1; Jorge Casuso, Housing Officials Taking Tough New Tack on
Drugs, CHI. TRIB., July 30, 1989, § 4, at 1; Mack Reed, Jackson, in Wilmington, Blasts Evic-
tion Policy for Drug Arrests, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 3, 1989, at 7-B.
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